

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 145829

TOSEC 344

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OVIP

SUBJECT: NATIONAL EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR INFORMAL 10-15
MINUTE REMARKS BEFORE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE ON
JULY 18.

2. LET ME BRIEFLY REVIEW FOR YOU TODAY OUR OBJECTIVES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH OUR
ATLANTIC ALLIES. BUT FIRST LET ME ATTEMPT TO PLACE THESE
OBJECTIVES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR LARGER FOREIGN POLICY
DESIGN.

3. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HAS KNOWN LITTLE REPOSE. SINCE
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, INTERNATIONAL CRISES HAVE BEEN
INCREASING IN BOTH FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY. OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PEACE HAVE BEEN CREATED AND THEN LOST. NOW WE FACE
ANOTHER MOMENT FOR ACHIEVING A MORE PEACEFUL AND STABLE
WORLD. FIVE YEARS AGO EVEN I COULD NOT HAVE HOPED THAT IN
JUNE 1974:
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-- THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE AS WELCOME
IN EGYPT AS IN ISRAEL;

-- THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WOULD REAFFIRM ITS UNITY

AND VITALITY IN AN ATMOSPHERE DOMINATED BY DETENTE WITH THE EAST AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRESS THROUGHOUT THE WEST;

-- NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE REACHED THE STAGE WHERE MEETINGS AT THE SUMMIT WOULD BE CONSIDERED ALMOST ROUTINE.

4. THE GREATEST DANGER WE FACE IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT IS NOT FROM ABROAD BUT FROM WITHIN. SHOULD WE FORGET THE HISTORY OF THIS CENTURY, SHOULD WE BEGIN TO TAKE DETENTE AND DEFENSE FOR GRANTED, WE ARE DESTINED TO RELIVE THE YEARS OF TENSION, INSTABILITY AND WAR.

-- WE CANNOT SACRIFICE DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EXPECT SOVIET RESTRAINT IN EUROPE, INDOCHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- WE CANNOT UNDERMINE THE ALLIANCE BY UNILATERALLY WITHDRAWING OUR TROOPS AND EXPECT TO MAINTAIN A STABLE SITUATION IN EUROPE -- THE SOURCE OF TWO WORLD WARS IN THIS CENTURY.

-- AND WE CANNOT SECURE THE ENERGY RESOURCES WHICH JAPAN, WESTERN EUROPE AND AMERICA REQUIRE WITHOUT A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

5. THUS WHEN WE SPEAK OF A STRUCTURE OF PEACE IT IS MORE THAN AN ABSTRACTION. PROGRESS ON A BROAD FRONT IS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS.

6. TO ACHIEVE A DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET RESTRAINT IS ESSENTIAL. TO ACHIEVE A DURABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS ESSENTIAL. AND TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY
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OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, WE MUST ESTABLISH A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

7. THUS EACH COMPONENT OF OUR POLICY FORMS PART OF A LARGER MOSAIC.

THE MIDDLE EAST

8. PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST LAST MONTH REFLECTED OUR TWO FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA:

9. FIRST, THE TRIP WAS DESIGNED TO CONSOLIDATE AND DRAMATIZE THE MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE THAT HAS BEGUN AND TO

ASSURE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WE ARE PURSUING. THE PRESIDENT REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY SINCE OCTOBER AND HEARD THE VIEWS OF THE LEADERS ON HOW THE NEGOTIATING MOMENTUM CAN BE MAINTAINED.

10. SECOND, AS WE STOPPED IN EACH CAPITAL, WE CONCENTRATED ON THE U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT COUNTRY. IN SOME CASES, SUCH AS JORDAN AND ISRAEL, RELATIONS HAVE CONTINUED GOOD THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, AND THE VISIT SERVED TO REAFFIRM THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN THEIR SECURITY AND WELFARE. IN THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA, A TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP HAD UNDERGONE NEW CHALLENGES STEMMING FROM BOTH THE MIDDLE EAST AND ENERGY CRISES, AND THE VISIT INAUGURATED A BROADER AND MORE INTIMATE STAGE IN OUR RELATIONS. IN THE OTHER CASES, WITH SYRIA FORMAL RELATIONS DID NOT EXIST WHEN WE ARRIVED AND WITH EGYPT HAD ONLY RECENTLY BEEN RESTORED. WITH ALL FIVE NATIONS WE HAVE INAUGURATED A MORE COOPERATIVE AND HOPEFUL ERA.

11. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE LEADERS AND PEOPLES OF THE NATIONS WE VISITED GENUINELY WANT A LASTING PEACE. AND I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT THEY WANT AND REQUIRE A MAJOR AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO SUCH A PEACE.

12. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS CLEAR THAT IT IS THE NATIONS
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OF THE REGION THEMSELVES WHO MUST MAKE THE HARD DECISIONS TO FORGE A LASTING PEACE AND THAT WE ARE STILL AT THE BEGINNING OF A LONG ROAD. IT WILL NOT BE EASY FOR THESE COUNTRIES TO OVERCOME DECADES OF HOSTILITY AND CONFLICT. BUT THE FIRST CRUCIAL STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND PROSPECTS ARE MORE HOPEFUL THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

13. OVER THE PAST DECADE MANY HAVE PREDICTED THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WOULD BE SERIOUSLY WEAKENED BY A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OTHERS FORECAST THAT ECONOMIC STRESSES WOULD LEAD TO AN UNRAVELLING OF THE INTANGIBLE FABRIC OF COOPERATION THAT SUPPORTS THE ALLIANCE. MOST COMMENTATORS WOULD HAVE STATED THAT THE ALLIANCE CLEARLY COULD NOT SURVIVE A COMBINATION OF BOTH.

14. NATO HAS NOT ONLY SURVIVED. AT A MOMENT MARKED BY THE AMBIGUITIES OF DETENTE AND A SERIES OF NEW CHALLENGES TO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, WE HAVE SIGNED A DECLARATION OF UNITY. WE HAVE COMMITTED OUR NATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO A SECOND QUARTER CENTURY OF CLOSE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION.

15. BUT THE BASIC CHALLENGES TO OUR UNITY REMAIN. IN THE FIELDS OF DETENTE AND DEFENSE, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE MUST BE PRESERVED AS THE FIRM AND FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR AMERICAN POLICY. NO SOVIET LEADER SHOULD EVER BE LEFT IN THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT ABOUT THIS FACT. AT THE TIME OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, THE LEVEL OF AMERICAN CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES REACHED A NEW INTENSITY AND INTIMACY, ONE WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN.

16. IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, WE FACE CHALLENGES UNPRECEDENTED IN THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY -- GLOBAL INFLATION OVERWHELMING NATIONAL ECONOMIES, PRESSURES TO DIVIDE THE WORLD ANEW INTO COMPETING BLOCS WITH BEGGAR-THY-NEIGHBOR POLICIES, AND SHORTAGES OF ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS AND FOOD THREATENING THE PROSPERITY OF THE RICH AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE POOR.

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17. THIS IS A THREAT NOT JUST TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, BUT TO OUR HOPES FOR A MORE COOPERATIVE, STABLE AND PEACEFUL WORLD. A WORLD TORN BY ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION CANNOT BE A WORLD OF POLITICAL COOPERATION. AT THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY AND THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN APRIL, WE BEGAN TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK TO MANAGE THE WORLD'S GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE. THERE IS NO MORE URGENT TASK FACING AMERICA, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE WORLD.

MOSCOW SUMMIT

18. THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION CAME AT AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT JUNCTURE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE DOMESTIC DEBATE IN THIS COUNTRY OVER THE MEANING OF DETENTE AND ITS FURTHER EVOLUTION HAS RAISED SOME FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS BOTH AT HOME AND IN MOSCOW.

19. I WANT TO CLARIFY FOR THIS CONFERENCE WHAT WE CONCEIVE TO BE THE PURPOSES OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW WE PURSUED IT IN THE MOSCOW MEETINGS.

20. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRANSFORMED. IN THE POSTWAR ERA WHEN THERE WERE LONG PERIODS OF EXTREMELY HIGH TENSIONS AND CONFRONTATION, IT WAS CONSIDERED AN ACHIEVEMENT MERELY TO LOWER TENSIONS AND DIMINISH THE CONFRONTATION. INDEED, THIS WAS THE MAJOR PURPOSE OF PREVIOUS SUMMIT MEETINGS, SEVERAL OF

WHICH ACTUALLY HEIGHTENED INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. IN 1974, HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR HAD BEEN MARKED BY A STEADY IMPROVEMENT IS MORE OR LESS TAKEN FOR GRANTED, AND MANY ARE TEMPTED TO SEEK MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVES.

21. I MIGHT NOTE THAT THE DEBATE OVER CHANGING THE SOVIET DOMESTIC STRUCTURE AS AN OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE IN 1969.
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22. THE POLICY WE HAVE PURSUED WAS BORN OF NECESSITY -- THE NECESSITY IN AN AGE OF A VAST ACCUMULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF WAR, TO LIMIT THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, IN PARTICULAR, AND TO INCREASE THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE. ANY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION MUST SOONER OR LATER COME BACK TO SUCH A POLICY.

23. OUR AIM THEREFORE HAS BEEN TO WORK OUT WITH THE SOVIET UNION A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON CERTAIN MODES OF BEHAVIOR, TO PUT OUR RELATIONS ON A MORE NORMAL BASIS, AND IN THIS SENSE TO COEXIST PEACEFULLY.

24. WE HAVE PURSUED THESE AIMS IN THREE INTERRELATED AREAS:

-- FIRST, IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WE HAVE SOUGHT TO BROADEN THE INTERCOURSE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS OVER A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. OUR HOPE IS THAT, IN DOING SO, BOTH SIDES WILL BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO THE HABIT OF COOPERATION BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT ENDEAVOR, RATHER THAN ASSUMING FROM THE OUTSET THAT ANY US-SOVIET PROJECT WAS BY DEFINITION POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. AT THIS SUMMIT WE SIGNED A NUMBER OF NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS (TRADE, ENERGY, HOUSING, ARTIFICIAL HEARTS, CONSULATES).

-- SECOND, WE HAVE PURSUED ARMS CONTROL BY DEALING FIRST WITH THE GROWTH IN STRATEGIC FORCES AND NOW TURNING TO THE MORE COMPLEX ISSUES OF QUALITATIVE CHANGE. AT THIS SUMMIT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH TWO CONCRETE AGREEMENTS (TREATY ON UNDERGROUND TESTS, ABM PROTOCOLS). AND WE CONCLUDED THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A NEW AGREEMENT TO COVER THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 DEALING WITH BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS WHETHER WE CAN LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY BEFORE IT GETS BEYOND THE POINT OF POLITICAL CONTROL. IF IT

RUNS UNCHECKED THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS WILL REACH PROPORTIONS ASTROMONICAL COMPARED TO THE TIME WHEN ARMAGEDDON
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SEEMED NEAR, WHEN THERE WERE SOMETHING LESS THAN 1,000 WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES. THIS IS A PROBLEM FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS MUST FACE BUT ONE WHICH GROWS MORE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL WITH EACH PASSING MONTH.

-- THIRD, WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS HOW EACH OF US SHOULD CONDUCT OURSELVES IN THE WORLD; OUR CONCEPT WAS THAT A COMPETITIVE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL GAINS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER, NO MATTER HOW TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS, IN THE END COULD ONLY LEAD TO CONFRONTATION AND DISASTER. AT THE SUMMIT WE CONCENTRATED ON CSCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

25. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT IN EACH OF THESE AREAS WE HAVE REGISTERED SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MOVE FROM A RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERIZED BY CONFRONTATION TO ONE CHARACTERIZED MORE BY RESTRAINT, WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM OF MOVING TO A RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE WE HAVE GROUNDED PROGRESS IN SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS ALLEVIATING CONCRETE SOURCES OF CONFLICT AND TENSIONS AND BECAUSE WE HAVE MAINTAINED AN INTERDEPENDENCY AMONG ALL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP -- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC.

26. BUT THE MEETING THIS YEAR SHOULD BE VIEWED NOT SO MUCH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF HOW MANY AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED, OR, INDEED, WHETHER ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. RATHER, THE PERSPECTIVE IS ONE OF A CONTINUING POLITICAL PROCESS IN WHICH "DETENTE", AS IT IS NOW CALLED, BECOMES MORE DEEPLY IMBEDDED IN THE CONDUCT OF POLICY ON BOTH SIDES, AND IN WHICH THE PROCESS ITSELF IS NOT SUBJECT TO CAPRICIOUS REVERSAL.

CONCLUSION

27. I HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND THE SOVIET UNION AS THEY HAVE BEEN THE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORTS IN RECENT WEEKS. BUT WE FACE EQUALLY IMPORTANT CHALLENGES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD -- BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENTIAL

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REPUBLIC OF CHINA, GIVING CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO OUR REJUVENATED PARTNERSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA, HELPING TO MEET THE GLOBAL PROBLEMS OF POPULATION, POLLUTION, FOOD, FERTILIZER AND FUEL.

28. THUS AS WE PROCEED TO YOUR QUESTIONS, I HOPE YOU WILL

FEEL FREE TO ADDRESS ANY OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY
CONCERNS. SISCO

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